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ABSTRACT Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models
are a prominent tool for forecasting at central banks, and the competitive
forecasting performance of these models relative to alternatives, including
official forecasts, has been documented. When evaluating DSGE models on
an absolute basis, however, we ﬁnd that the benchmark estimated medium-
scale DSGE model forecasts inﬂation and GDP growth very poorly, although
statistical and judgmental forecasts do equally poorly. Our finding is the
DSGE model analogue of the literature documenting the recent poor perfor-
mance of macroeconomic forecasts relative to simple naive forecasts since the
onset of the Great Moderation. Although this ﬁnding is broadly consistent
with the DSGE model we employ—the model itself implies that especially
under strong monetary policy, inﬂation deviations should be unpredictable—a
“wrong” model may also have the same implication. We therefore argue that
forecasting ability during the Great Moderation is not a good metric by which
to judge models.
D
ynamic stochastic general equilibrium models were descriptive tools
at their inception. They were useful because they allowed econo-
mists to think about business cycles and carry out hypothetical policy
experiments in Lucas critique–proof frameworks. In their early form, how-
ever, they were viewed as too minimalist to be appropriate for use in any
practical application, such as macroeconomic forecasting, for which a
strong connection to the data was needed.
The seminal work of Frank Smets and Raf Wouters (2003, 2007)
changed this perception. In particular, their demonstration of the possibility
of estimating a much larger and more richly speciﬁed DSGE model (similar
to that developed by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005), as well as
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to competing vector autoregressive (VAR) and Bayesian VAR (BVAR)
models, led DSGE models to be taken more seriously by central bankers
around the world. Indeed, estimated DSGE models are now quite prominent
tools for macroeconomic analysis at many policy institutions, with forecast-
ing being one of the key areas where these models are used, in conjunction
with other forecasting methods.
Reﬂecting this wider use, in recent research several central bank model-
ing teams have evaluated the relative forecasting performance of their insti-
tutions’ estimated DSGE models. Notably, in addition to considering their
DSGE models’ forecasts relative to time-series models such as BVARs, as
Smets and Wouters did, these papers consider ofﬁcial central bank fore-
casts. For the United States, Edge, Michael Kiley, and Jean-Philippe
Laforte (2010) compare the Federal Reserve Board’s DSGE model’s fore-
casts with alternative forecasts such as those generated in pseudo-real time
by time-series models, as well as with ofﬁcial Greenbook forecasts, and
ﬁnd that the DSGE model forecasts are competitive with, and indeed often
better than, others.
1 This is an especially notable ﬁnding given that previ-
ous analyses have documented the high quality of the Federal Reserve’s
Greenbook forecasts (Romer and Romer 2000, Sims 2002).
We began writing this paper with the aim of establishing the marginal
contributions of statistical, judgmental, and DSGE model forecasts to efﬁ-
cient forecasts of key macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth and
inﬂation. The question we wanted to answer was how much importance
central bankers should attribute to model forecasts on top of judgmental or
statistical forecasts. To do this, we ﬁrst evaluated the forecasting perfor-
mance of the Smets and Wouters (2007) model, a popular benchmark, for
U.S. GDP growth, inﬂation, and interest rates and compared these fore-
casts with those of a BVAR and the Federal Reserve staff’s Greenbook.
Importantly, to ensure that the same information is used to generate our
DSGE model and BVAR model forecasts as was used to formulate the
Greenbook forecasts, we used only data available at the time of the corre-
sponding Greenbook forecast (referred to hereafter as “real-time data”)
and reestimated the model at each Greenbook forecast date.
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1. Other examples with similar ﬁndings include Adolfson and others (2007) for the
Swedish Riksbank’s DSGE model and Lees, Matheson, and Smith (2007) for the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand’s DSGE model. In addition, Adolfson and others (2007) and
Christoffel, Coenen, and Warne (forthcoming) examine out-of-sample forecast performance
for DSGE models of the euro area, although the focus of these papers is much more on tech-
nical aspects of model evaluation.
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found that the root mean squared errors (RMSEs) of the DSGE model fore-
casts were similar to, and often better than, those of the BVAR and Green-
book forecasts. Our surprising ﬁnding was that, unlike what one would
expect when told that the model forecast is better than that of the Green-
book, the DSGE model in an absolute sense did a very poor job of forecast-
ing. The Greenbook and the time-series model forecasts similarly did not
capture much of the realized changes in GDP growth and inflation 
in our sample period, 1992 to 2006. These models showed a moderate
amount of nowcasting ability, but almost no forecasting ability beginning
with 1-quarter-ahead forecasts. Thus, our comparison is not between one
good forecast and another; rather, all three methods of forecasting are
poor, and combining them does not lead to much improvement.
This ﬁnding reﬂects the changed nature of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations
in the Great Moderation, the period of lower macroeconomic volatility that
began in the mid-1980s. For example, James Stock and Mark Watson
(2007) have shown that since the beginning of the Great Moderation, the
permanent (forecastable) component of inﬂation, which had earlier domi-
nated, has diminished to the point where the inﬂation process has been
largely inﬂuenced by the transitory (unforecastable) component. (Peter
Tulip 2009 makes an analogous point for GDP.) Lack of data prevents us
from determining whether the forecasting ability of estimated DSGE mod-
els has worsened with the Great Moderation. We do, however, examine
whether these models’ forecasting performance is in an absolute sense
poor. We ﬁnd that it is.
A key point, however, is that forecasting ability is not always a good cri-
terion for judging a model’s success. As we discuss in more detail below,
DSGE models of the class we consider often imply that under a strong
monetary policy rule, macroeconomic forecastability should be low. In
other words, when there is not much to be forecasted in the observed out-
of-sample data, as is the case in the Great Moderation, a “wrong” model
will fail to forecast, but so will a “correct” model. Consequently, it is
entirely possible that a model that is unable to forecast, say, inﬂation will
nonetheless provide reasonable counterfactual scenarios, which is ulti-
mately the main purpose of the DSGE models.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the methodology
behind each of the different forecasts that we will consider, including those
generated by the Smets and Wouters (2007) DSGE model, the BVAR
model, the Greenbook, and the consensus forecast published by Blue Chip
Economic Indicators. We include the Blue Chip forecast primarily because
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want to consider the most recent recession. Section II then describes the
data that we use, which, as noted, are those that were available to forecast-
ers in real time, to ensure that the same information is used to generate our
DSGE model and BVAR model forecasts as was used to formulate the
Greenbook and Blue Chip forecasts. Section III describes and presents the
results for our forecast comparison exercises, and section IV discusses these
results. Section V considers robustness analysis and extensions, showing in
particular that judgmental forecasts have adjusted faster than the others to
capture developments during the Great Recession. Section VI concludes.
A contribution of this paper is the construction of real-time datasets
using data vintages that match the Greenbook and Blue Chip forecast
dates. The appendix describes the construction of these data in detail.
2
I. Forecast Methods
In this section we brieﬂy review the four different forecasts that we will
later consider. These are a DSGE model forecast, a Bayesian VAR model
forecast, the Federal Reserve Board’s Greenbook forecast, and the Blue
Chip consensus forecast.
I.A. The DSGE Model
The DSGE model that we use in this paper is identical to that of Smets
and Wouters (2007), and the description given here follows quite closely
that presented in section 1 of Smets and Wouters (2007) and section II of
Smets and Wouters (2003). The Smets and Wouters model is an applica-
tion of a real business cycle model (in the spirit of King, Plosser, and
Rebelo 1988) to an economy with sticky prices and sticky wages. In addi-
tion to these nominal rigidities, the model contains a large number of real
rigidities—speciﬁcally, habit formation in consumption, costs of adjust-
ment in capital accumulation, and variable capacity utilization—that ulti-
mately appear to be necessary to capture the empirical persistence of U.S.
macroeconomic phenomena.
The model consists of households, ﬁrms, and a monetary authority.
Households maximize a nonseparable utility function, with goods and labor
effort as its arguments, over an inﬁnite life horizon. Consumption enters the
utility function relative to a time-varying external habit variable, and labor
212 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
2. All of the data used in this paper, except the Blue Chip median forecasts, which are
proprietary, are available at www.bilkent.edu.tr/∼refet/research.html.
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enables the household sector to have some monopoly power over wages.
This implies a speciﬁc wage-setting equation that, in turn, allows for the
inclusion of sticky nominal wages, modeled following Guillermo Calvo
(1983). Capital accumulation is undertaken by households, who then rent
that capital to the economy’s ﬁrms. In accumulating capital, households
face adjustment costs—speciﬁcally, investment adjustment costs. As the
rental price of capital changes, the utilization of capital can be adjusted,
albeit at an increasing cost.
The ﬁrms in the model rent labor (through a union) and capital from
households to produce differentiated goods, for which they set prices,
which are subject to Calvo (1983) price stickiness. These differentiated
goods are aggregated into a ﬁnal good by different, perfectly competitive
ﬁrms in the model, and it is this good that is used for consumption and
accumulating capital.
The Calvo model in both wage and price setting is augmented by the
assumption that prices that are not reoptimized are partially indexed to past
inﬂation rates. Prices are therefore set in reference to current and expected
marginal costs but are also determined, through indexation, by the past
inﬂation rate. Marginal costs depend on the wage and the rental rate of
capital. Wages are set analogously as a function of current and expected
marginal rates of substitution between leisure and consumption and are
partially determined by the past wage inﬂation rate because of indexation.
The model assumes, following Miles Kimball (1995), a variant of Dixit-
Stiglitz aggregation in the goods and labor markets. This aggregation
allows for time-varying demand elasticities, which allows more realistic
estimates of price and wage stickiness.
Finally, the model contains seven structural shock variables, equal to
the number of observables used in estimation. The model’s observable
variables are the log difference of real GDP per capita, real consumption,
real investment, the real wage, log hours worked, the log difference of the
GDP deﬂator, and the federal funds rate. These series, and in particular
their real-time sources, are discussed in detail below.
In estimation, the seven observed variables are mapped into 14 model
variables by the Kalman ﬁlter. Then, 36 parameters (17 of which belong to
the seven autoregressive moving average shock processes in the model)
are estimated by Bayesian methods (5 parameters are calibrated). It is the
combination of the Kalman ﬁlter and Bayesian estimation that allows this
large (although technically called a medium-scale) model to be estimated
rather than calibrated. In our estimations we use exactly the same priors as
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is estimated for a given data vintage, forecasting is done by employing the
posterior modes for each parameter. The model can produce forecasts for
all model variables, but we use only the GDP growth, inﬂation, and inter-
est rate forecasts.
I.B. The Bayesian VAR Model
The Bayesian VAR is, in its essence, a simple four-lag vector auto-
regression forecasting model, or VAR(4). The same seven observable
series that are used in the DSGE model estimation are used. Having seven
variables in a four-lag VAR leads to a large number of parameters to be
estimated, which leads to overﬁtting and poor out-of-sample forecast per-
formance. The solution is the same as for the DSGE model. Priors are
assigned to each parameter (we again use those of Smets and Wouters
2007), and the data are used to update these in the VAR framework. Like
the DSGE model, the BVAR is estimated at every forecast date using real-
time data, and forecasts are obtained by utilizing the modes of the posterior
densities for each parameter.
Both the judgmental forecast and the DSGE model have an advantage
over the purely statistical model, the BVAR, in that the people who produce
the Greenbook and Blue Chip forecasts obviously know a lot more than
seven time series, and the DSGE model was built to match the data that are
being forecast. That is, judgment also enters the DSGE model in the form of
modeling choices. To help the BVAR overcome this handicap, it is cus-
tomary to have a training sample, that is, to estimate the model with some
data and use the posteriors as priors in the actual estimation. Following
Smets and Wouters (2007), we also “trained” the BVAR with data from
1955 to 1965, but, in a sign of how different the early and the late parts of
the sample are, we found that the trained and the untrained BVARs perform
comparably. We therefore report results from the untrained BVAR only.
I.C. The Greenbook
The Greenbook forecast is a detailed judgmental forecast that until
March 2010 (after which it became known as the Tealbook) was produced
eight times a year by staff at the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve  System.
3 The schedule on which Greenbook forecasts are 
214 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
3. The renaming of the Federal Reserve Board’s main forecasting document in early
2010 reﬂected a reorganization and combination of the original Greenbook and Bluebook.
Throughout this paper we will continue to refer to the Federal Reserve Board’s main fore-
casting document as the Greenbook.
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what irregular, since the Greenbook is made speciﬁcally for each Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting, and the timings of FOMC
meetings are themselves somewhat irregular. Broadly speaking, FOMC
meetings take place at approximately 6-week intervals, although they tend
to be further apart at the beginning of the year and closer together at the
end of the year. The Greenbook is generally closed about 1 week before
the FOMC meeting, to allow FOMC members and participants enough
time to review the document. Importantly—and unlike at several other
central banks—the Greenbook forecast reﬂects the view of the staff and
not the views of the FOMC members.
Greenbook forecasts are formulated subject to a set of assumed paths
for ﬁnancial variables, such as the policy interest rate, key market interest
rates, and stock market wealth. Over time there has been some variation in
the way these assumptions are set. For example, as can be seen from the
Greenbook federal funds rate assumptions reported in the Philadelphia
Federal Reserve Bank’s Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists, from
about the middle of 1990 to the middle of 1992, the forecast assumed an
essentially constant path of the federal funds rate.
4 In other periods, how-
ever, the path of the federal funds rate has varied, reﬂecting a conditioning
assumption about the path of monetary policy consistent with the forecast.
As with most judgmental forecasts, the maximum projection horizon
for the Greenbook forecast is not constant across vintages but varies from
6 to 10 quarters, depending on the forecast round. The July-August round
of each year has the shortest projection horizon of any, extending 6 quar-
ters: from the current (third) quarter through the fourth quarter of the fol-
lowing year. In the September round, the staff extend the forecast to
include the year following the next in the projection period. Since the third
quarter is not yet ended at the time of the September forecast, that quarter
is still included in the projection horizon. Thus, the horizon for that round
is 10 quarters—the longest for any forecast round. The endpoint of the pro-
jection horizon remains ﬁxed for subsequent forecasts until the next July-
August round, as the starting point moves forward. In our analysis we
consider a maximum forecast horizon of 8 quarters, because the number of
observations of forecasts covering 9 and 10 quarters is very small. Of
course, the number of observations for forecast horizons of 7 and 8 quar-
ters (which we do consider) will be smaller than the number of observa-
tions for horizons of 6 quarters and shorter.
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from January 1992 to December 2004. Our start date represents the quarter
when GDP, rather than GNP, became the key indicator of economic activ-
ity. This is not a critical limitation, since GNP forecasts could be used for
earlier vintages. The end date was chosen by necessity: as already noted,
Greenbook forecasts are made public only with a 5-year lag. Tables 1 to 13
in the online appendix provide detailed information on the dates of
Greenbook forecasts we use and the horizons covered in each forecast.
5
(Appendix table A1 of this paper provides an example of how these tables
look.) Note that the ﬁrst four Greenbook forecasts that we consider fall
during a period when the policy rate was assumed to remain ﬂat through-
out the projection period.
I.D. The Blue Chip Consensus Forecast
The Blue Chip consensus forecast is based on a monthly poll of fore-
casters at approximately 50 banks, corporations, and consulting ﬁrms and
reports their forecasts of U.S. economic growth, inﬂation, interest rates,
and a range of other key variables. The Blue Chip poll is taken on about
the 4th or 5th of the month, and the forecasts are published on the 10th of
that month. The consensus forecast, equal to the mean of the individual
reported forecasts, is then reported along with averages of the top 10 and
the bottom 10 forecasts for each variable. In our analysis we use only the
consensus forecast.
As with the Greenbook, the Blue Chip forecast horizons are not con-
stant across forecast rounds; in the case of the Blue Chip, the forecast hori-
zons are uniformly shorter. The longest forecast horizon in the Blue Chip
is 9 quarters. This is for the January round, for which a forecast is made for
the year just beginning and the next, but since data for the fourth quarter of
the previous year are not yet available, that quarter is also “forecast.” The
shortest forecast horizon in the Blue Chip is 5 quarters. This is for the
November and December rounds, for which a forecast is made for the cur-
rent (fourth) quarter and the following year.
We use the Blue Chip consensus forecasts over the period January
1992 to September 2009. The start date is chosen because it is the same
as the start date for the Greenbook, and the end date is 1 year before the
conference draft of this paper was written, so that the realized values of
forecasted variables are also known.
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5. Online appendices to papers in this issue may be found on the Brookings Papers web-
page (www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea), under “Conferences and Papers.”
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In this section we provide a brief overview of the data involved in the fore-
casting process and of our sample period. The appendix provides detail on
our sources and information on how the raw data were converted to the
form used in estimation.
The data we use for the estimation of the Smets and Wouters DSGE
model and the BVAR model are the same seven series used by Smets
and Wouters (2007), but only the real-time vintages of each series at
each forecast date are used. Our forecast dates coincide with either the
dates of Greenbook forecasts or those of the Blue Chip forecasts. That
is, at each Greenbook or Blue Chip forecast date, we use only the data
that were available as of that date to estimate the DSGE model and the
BVAR.
6 We then generate forecasts out to 8 quarters. From the data 
perspective, the last known quarter is the previous one; therefore the 
1-quarter-ahead forecast is the nowcast, and the n-quarter-ahead fore-
cast corresponds to n − 1 quarters ahead, counting from the forecast
date. This convention is also followed for the Greenbook and most Blue
Chip forecasts.
7
We evaluate the forecasts for growth in real GDP per capita, inﬂation as
measured by the GDP deﬂator, and the short-term (policy) interest rate.
GDP growth and inflation are expressed in terms of nonannualized,
quarter-on-quarter rates, and interest rates are in levels. Our main focus
will be on the inﬂation forecasts, because this is the forecast that is the
most comparable across the different forecasting methods. The DSGE
model and the BVAR produce continuous (and in very recent periods neg-
ative) interest rate forecasts, whereas the judgmental forecasts obviously
factor in the discrete nature of interest rate setting and the zero nominal
bound. The Blue Chip forecasts do not contain forecasts of the federal
funds rate, and hence we cannot perform robustness checks for the interest
rate forecast or use the longer sample for this variable.
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6. See the appendix for exceptions. In a few instances, one of the variables from the last
quarter had not yet been released on a Greenbook forecast date. In these instances we help
the DSGE and BVAR forecasts by appending the Federal Reserve Board staff backcast of
that data point to the time series. We verify that doing so does not inﬂuence our results by
dropping these forecast observations from our analysis and rerunning our results.
7. The exceptions for the Blue Chip forecasts are the January, April, July, and October
forecasts. These typically take place so early in the quarter that few or no data for the pre-
ceding quarter are available. For these forecasts the previous quarter is considered the
nowcast.
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on per capita values and produces a forecast of growth in GDP per capita,
as does the BVAR. On the other hand, GDP growth itself is announced in
aggregate, not per capita, terms, and the Greenbook and Blue Chip forecasts
are expressed in terms of aggregate growth. Thus, one has to either convert
the aggregate growth rates to per capita values by dividing them by real-
ized population growth rates, or convert the per capita values to aggregate
forecasts by multiplying them by realized population growth numbers.
The two methods should produce similar results, and the fact that the
model uses per capita data should make little difference, as population
growth is a smooth series with little variance. However, the population
numbers reported by the Census Bureau and used by Smets and Wouters
(and in subsequent work by others) have a number of extremely sharp
spikes caused by the census picking up previously uncaptured population
levels as well as by rebasings of the Current Population Survey. The spikes
remain because the data are not revised backward; that is, population
growth is assumed to have occurred in the quarter that the previously
uncaptured population is ﬁrst included, not estimated across the quarters
over which it more likely occurred.
For this paper we used the population series used by Smets and Wouters
in estimating the model, because we discovered the erratic behavior of the
series only after our estimation and forecast exercise was complete. (We
estimate the model more than 300 times, which took about 2 months, and
did not have time to reestimate and reforecast using the better population
series.) We note the violence that the unsmoothed series does to the model
estimates and encourage future researchers to smooth the population series
before using the data to obtain GDP per capita. Here we adjust the DSGE
model and BVAR forecasts using the realized future population growth
numbers to make them comparable to announced GDP growth rates and
judgmental forecasts, but we again note that this is an imperfect adjust-
ment, which likely reduces the forecasting ability of the DSGE model and
the BVAR.
8
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8. We also experimented with converting the realized aggregate GDP growth numbers
and Blue Chip forecasts to per capita values using the realized population growth rates, and
converting the Greenbook GDP growth forecast into per capita values by using the Federal
Reserve Board staff’s internal population forecast. This essentially gives Blue Chip forecasts
perfect foresight about the population component of GDP per capita, which improves their
forecasting considerably because the variance of the population series is high, and weakens
the Greenbook GDP forecast considerably because the Federal Reserve staff’s population
growth estimate is a smooth series. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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1965 and perform the first forecast as of January 1992. Because the
Greenbook forecasts are embargoed for 5 years, our last forecast is as of
2004Q4, forecasting out to 2006Q3. There are two scheduled FOMC
meetings per quarter, and thus all of our forecasts that are compared with
the Greenbook are made twice a quarter. This has consequences for cor-
related forecast errors, as explained in the next section. For the Blue
Chip forecasts, the forecasting period ends in 2010Q1, the last quarter
for which we knew the realized values of the variables of interest at the
time the conference draft of this paper was written. The Blue Chip fore-
casts are published monthly, and we produce a separate set of real-time
DSGE and BVAR model forecasts coinciding with the Blue Chip publi-
cation dates.
We should note that our sample period for Greenbook comparisons,
1992 to 2004, is similar but not identical to those used in previous studies
of the forecasting ability of DSGE models, such as Smets and Wouters
(2007), who use 1990 to 2004, and Edge and others (2010), who use 1996
to 2002. Again, the sample falls within the Great Moderation period, after
the long disinﬂation was complete, and most of the period corresponds to a
particularly transparent period of monetary policymaking, during which
the FOMC signaled its likely near-term policy actions with statements
accompanying releases of its interest rate decisions.
III. Forecast Comparisons
We distinguish between two types of forecast evaluations. Given a vari-
able to be forecasted, x, and its h-period-ahead forecast (made h periods in
the past) by method y, ˆ x
h
y, one can compute the RMSE of the real-time fore-
casts of each model:
Comparing the RMSEs across different forecast methods, a policymaker
can then choose the method with the smallest RMSE to use. The RMSE
comparison therefore answers the decision theory question: Which forecast
is the best and should be used? To our knowledge, all of the forecast eval-
uations of DSGE models so far (Smets and Wouters 2007, Edge and others
2010, and those mentioned earlier for other countries) have used essen-
tially this metric and concluded that the model forecasts do well.
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In ﬁgure 1 we show results of this exercise with real-time data and com-
pare the RMSEs of the DSGE model forecasts for inﬂation and GDP
growth with those of the Greenbook and BVAR forecasts at different hori-
zons. This ﬁgure, which reports the ratios of the RMSEs from two models,
visually conveys a result that Smets and Wouters and Edge and others have
shown earlier: except for inﬂation forecasts at very short horizons (where
the Greenbook forecasts are better), the DSGE model forecasts have the
lower RMSE for both inﬂation and growth in all comparisons. The litera-
ture has taken this ﬁnding both as a vindication of the estimated medium-
scale DSGE model, and as evidence that these models can be used for
12367-04a_Edge-rev3.qxd  2/17/11  10:31 AM  Page 220forecasting as well as for positive analysis of counterfactuals and for
informing optimal policy.
Although ﬁgure 1 does indeed show that the DSGE model has the best
forecasting record among the three methods we consider, it offers no clues
about how good the “best” is. To further evaluate the forecasts, we ﬁrst
present, in ﬁgure 2, scatterplots of the 4-quarter-ahead forecasts (a horizon
at which the DSGE model outperforms the Greenbook and BVAR) of
inﬂation and GDP growth from the DSGE model and the realized values of
these variables. The better the forecast performance, the closer the obser-
vations should fall to the 45-degree line.
Instead ﬁgure 2 shows that, for both variables, the points form clouds
rather than 45-degree lines, suggesting that the 4-quarter-ahead forecast of
the DSGE model is quite unrelated to the realized value. To get the full
picture, we run a standard forecast efﬁciency test (see Gürkaynak and
Wolfers 2007 for a discussion of tests of forecast efﬁciency and further ref-
erences) and estimate the following equation:
A good forecast should have an intercept of zero, a slope coefﬁcient of
1, and a high R
2. If the intercept is different from zero, the forecast has on
average been biased; if the slope differs from 1, the forecast has consis-
tently under- or overpredicted deviations from the mean, and if the R
2 is
low, then little of the variation of the variable to be forecasted is captured




are different from zero and 1, respectively, the R2 is a more charitable mea-
sure of the success of the forecast than the RMSE calculated in equation 1,
as the errors in equation 2 are residuals obtained from the best-ﬁtting line.
That is, a policymaker would make errors of size ε
h




y and used them to adjust ˆ xh
y. The R2 that is comparable to
the RMSE measures calculated in equation 1 would be that implied by
equation 2 with α
h
y and βh
y constrained to zero and 1, respectively.
Tables 1, 2, and 3 show the estimation results of equation 2 for the
DSGE model, BVAR, and Greenbook forecasts of inﬂation, GDP growth,
and interest rates.
9 The tables suggest that forecasts of inﬂation and GDP







h =+ + αβ ε
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9. The standard errors reported are Newey-West standard errors for 2h lags, given that
there are two forecasts made in each quarter. Explicitly taking into account the clustering at
the level of quarters (since forecasts made in the same quarter may be correlated) made no
perceptible difference. Neither did using only the ﬁrst or the second forecast in each quarter.
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Figure 2. Realized and Four-Quarters-Ahead DSGE Forecast Inﬂation and GDP Growth
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis data and authors’ calculations.
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Table 1. Inﬂation Forecast Accuracy: DSGE, BVAR, and Greenbooka
Quarters ahead
Forecast 1 2 3 4 5 6
DSGE model
Slope 0.451** 0.089 0.031 0.209 0.167 0.134
(0.108) (0.149) (0.250) (0.261) (0.216) (0.174)
Intercept 0.261** 0.421** 0.446** 0.363** 0.386** 0.398**
(0.051) (0.082) (0.122) (0.128) (0.112) (0.112)
Adjusted R
2 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
BVAR model
Slope 0.472** 0.205 0.224* 0.209 0.062 −0.033
(0.096) (0.133) (0.104) (0.121) (0.094) (0.119)
Intercept 0.216** 0.344** 0.322** 0.329** 0.430** 0.497**
(0.052) (0.091) (0.066) (0.085) (0.069) (0.097)
Adjusted R
2 0.17 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00
Greenbook
Slope 0.642** 0.288 0.268 0.209 −0.007 −0.386
(0.084) (0.161) (0.188) (0.245) (0.306) (0.253)
Intercept 0.138** 0.322** 0.332** 0.369** 0.477** 0.657**
(0.048) (0.091) (0.106) (0.130) (0.157) (0.136)
Adjusted R
2 0.48 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.06
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. Sample size is 104 observations in all regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indi-
cate statistical signiﬁcance at the **1 percent or the *5 percent level.
growth have been very poor by all methods, except for the Greenbook
inﬂation nowcast. The DSGE model inﬂation forecasts (table 1) have R
2s
of about zero for forecasts of the next quarter and beyond, and slope coef-
ﬁcients very far from unity. The DSGE model forecasts of GDP growth
(table 2) likewise capture less than 10 percent of the actual variation in
growth, and point estimates of the slopes are again far from unity. Again
except for the Greenbook nowcast, the results are very similar for the
Greenbook and the BVAR forecasts.
All three forecast methods, however, do impressively well at forecast-
ing interest rates (table 3). This is surprising since short-term rates should
be a function of inﬂation and GDP and thus should not be any more fore-
castable than those two variables, except for the forecastability coming
from interest rate smoothing by policymakers. The explanation here is that
the interest rate is highly serially correlated, which makes it relative easy
to forecast. (Indeed, in our sample the level of the interest rate behaves like
a unit root process, as veriﬁed by an augmented Dickey-Fuller test not
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10 Thus, table 3 may be showing long-run cointegrating rela-
tionships rather than short-run forecasting ability. We therefore follow
Gürkaynak, Brian Sack, and Eric Swanson (2005) in studying the change
in the interest rate rather than its level.
Table 4 shows results for forecasts of changes in interest rates by the
three methods. These results are now more comparable to those for the
inﬂation and GDP growth forecasts, although in the short run there is
higher forecastability in interest rate changes. The very strong nowcasting
ability of the Greenbook derives partly from the fact that the Federal
Reserve staff know that interest rate changes normally occur in multiples
of 25 basis points, whereas, again, the BVAR and the DSGE model pro-
duce continuous interest rate forecasts.
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Table 2. GDP Growth Forecast Accuracy: DSGE, BVAR, and Greenbooka
Quarters ahead
Forecast 1 2 3 4 5 6
DSGE model
Slope 0.374* 0.485 0.477 0.507 0.485 0.553
(0.174) (0.249) (0.321) (0.303) (0.312) (0.279)
Intercept 0.419* 0.313 0.331 0.299 0.320 0.284
(0.206) (0.292) (0.362) (0.346) (0.344) (0.311)
Adjusted R
2 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06
BVAR model
Slope 0.041 −0.057 0.094 0.082 0.110 0.037
(0.130) (0.136) (0.143) (0.135) (0.146) (0.206)
Intercept 0.784** 0.894** 0.735** 0.754** 0.713** 0.815**
(0.160) (0.196) (0.198) (0.189) (0.205) (0.263)
Adjusted R
2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Greenbook
Slope 0.641** 0.260 −0.081 −0.115 −0.416 −0.001
(0.172) (0.339) (0.287) (0.318) (0.359) (0.422)
Intercept 0.561** 0.721** 0.875** 0.893** 1.015** 0.852**
(0.102) (0.179) (0.162) (0.181) (0.195) (0.233)
Adjusted R
2 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. Sample size is 104 observations in all regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indi-
cate statistical signiﬁcance at the **1 percent or the *5 percent level.
10. Although nominal interest rates cannot theoretically be simple unit-root processes
because of the zero nominal bound, they can be statistically indistinguishable from unit-root
processes in small samples and pose the same econometric difﬁculties.
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the DSGE model forecasts are comparable to and often better than the
Greenbook and BVAR forecasts, this is a comparison of very poor forecasts
with each other. To provide a benchmark for forecast quality, we introduce
a forecast series consisting simply of a constant and another that forecasts
each variable as a random walk, and we ask the following two questions.
First, if a policymaker could have used one of the above three forecasts
over the 1992–2006 period, or could have had access to the actual mean of
the series over the same period and used that as a forecast (using zero
change as the interest rate forecast at all horizons), how would the RMSEs
compare? Second, how large would the RMSEs be if the policymaker sim-
ply used the last observation available on each date as the forecast for all
horizons, essentially treating the series to be forecast as random walks?
11
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Table 3. Interest Rate Forecast Accuracy: DSGE, BVAR, and Greenbooka
Quarters ahead
Forecast 1 2 3 4 5 6
DSGE model
Slope 1.138** 1.286** 1.373** 1.385** 1.381** 1.324*
(0.031) (0.085) (0.181) (0.305) (0.416) (0.538)
Intercept −0.149** −0.308** −0.427** −0.483 −0.528 −0.512
(0.027) (0.068) (0.153) (0.289) (0.422) (0.582)
Adjusted R
2 0.95 0.83 0.66 0.48 0.35 0.24
BVAR model
Slope 0.924** 0.888** 0.867** 0.852** 0.828** 0.807**
(0.020) (0.041) (0.076) (0.126) (0.191) (0.262)
Intercept 0.056** 0.067 0.056 0.037 0.031 0.025
(0.020) (0.036) (0.064) (0.117) (0.195) (0.281)
Adjusted R
2 0.96 0.87 0.74 0.60 0.47 0.35
Greenbook
Slope 0.993** 0.962** 0.904** 0.829** 0.735** 0.614**
(0.006) (0.025) (0.057) (0.098) (0.148) (0.194)
Intercept 0.001 0.012 0.049 0.112 0.200 0.316
(0.006) (0.025) (0.056) (0.096) (0.150) (0.205)
Adjusted R
2 1.00 0.96 0.87 0.72 0.54 0.36
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. Sample size is 104 observations in all regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indi-
cate statistical signiﬁcance at the **1 percent or the *5 percent level.
11. In the random walk forecasts we set the interest rate change forecasts to zero. That
is, in this exercise the assumed policymaker treats the level of the interest rate as a random
walk.
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does about as well as the other forecasts, and often better, suggesting that
the DSGE model, BVAR, and Greenbook forecasts do not contribute
much information. It is some relief that the DSGE model forecast usually
does better than the random walk forecast, an often-used benchmark.
12
However, the random walk RMSEs are very large. To put the numbers
in perspective, observe that the RMSE of the 6-quarter-ahead inflation
forecast of the DSGE model is about 0.22 in quarterly terms, or about
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Table 4. Accuracy in Forecasting Changes in Interest Rates: DSGE, BVAR, 
and Greenbooka
Quarters ahead
Forecast 1 2 3 4 5 6
DSGE model
Slope 0.498** 0.453* 0.560* 0.862* 1.127* 1.003
(0.121) (0.173) (0.240) (0.411) (0.473) (0.507)
Intercept −0.012 −0.009 −0.017 −0.029 −0.041 −0.034
(0.016) (0.019) (0.023) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031)
Adjusted R
2 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.20 0.12
BVAR model
Slope 0.724** 0.978** 1.202* 1.064* 1.025* 1.040*
(0.133) (0.274) (0.459) (0.489) (0.476) (0.482)
Intercept −0.018 −0.027 −0.044 −0.043 −0.040 −0.038
(0.014) (0.019) (0.028) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Adjusted R
2 0.30 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.18
Greenbook
Slope 1.052** 1.191** 0.986** 0.588 0.423 −0.279
(0.030) (0.144) (0.212) (0.358) (0.215) (0.333)
Intercept −0.006 −0.022 −0.023 −0.011 −0.006 0.005
(0.003) (0.013) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022)
Adjusted R
2 0.96 0.50 0.14 0.03 0.02 0.01
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. Sample size is 104 observations in all regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indi-
cate statistical signiﬁcance at the **1 percent or the *5 percent level.
12. We also looked at how the DSGE model forecast RMSEs compare statistically with
other forecast RMSEs (results available from the authors upon request). Results of Diebold-
Mariano tests show that for inﬂation, the RMSE of the DSGE model is signiﬁcantly lower
than those of the BVAR and the random walk forecasts for most maturities, is indistinguish-
able from the RMSE of the Greenbook, and is higher than that of the constant forecast for
some maturities; for GDP growth the DSGE model RMSE is statistically lower than those of
the BVAR and the random walk forecasts and is indistinguishable from the RMSEs of the
Greenbook and the constant forecasts.
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0.9 percent annualized, with a 95 percent conﬁdence interval that is 3.6
percentage points wide. That is not very useful for policymaking.
IV. Discussion
Our ﬁndings, especially those for inﬂation, are surprising given the ﬁnding
of Christina Romer and David Romer (2000) that the Greenbook is an
excellent forecaster of inﬂation at horizons out to 8 quarters. Figure 4
shows the reason for the difference between their ﬁnding and ours. The
Romer and Romer sample covers a period when inﬂation swung widely,
whereas our sample—and the sample used in other studies for DSGE
model forecast evaluations—covers a period when inﬂation behaved more
like independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) deviations around a
constant. That is, there is little to be forecasted over our sample.
This ﬁnding is in line with Stock and Watson’s (2007) result that after
the Great Moderation began, the permanent (forecastable) component of
inﬂation, which had earlier dominated, diminished in importance, and the
bulk of the variance of inﬂation began to be driven by the transitory
(unforecastable) component. It is therefore not surprising that no forecast-
ing method does well. Bharat Trehan (2010) shows that a similar lack of
forecastability is also evident in the Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF) and the University of Michigan survey of inﬂation expectations.
Andrew Atkeson and Lee Ohanian (2001) document that over the period
1984 to 1999, a random walk forecast of 4-quarter-ahead inﬂation out-
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analysis ﬁnds that the DSGE model, with a sophisticated, microfounded
Phillips curve, outperforms the random walk forecast.) Jeff Fuhrer,
Giovanni Olivei, and Geoffrey Tootell (2009) show that this is due to the
parameter changes in the inﬂation process that occurred with the onset of
the Great Moderation. For forecasts of output growth, Tulip (2009) docu-
ments a notably larger reduction in actual output growth volatility follow-
ing the Great Moderation relative to the reduction in Greenbook RMSEs,
thus indicating that much of the reduction in output growth volatility has
stemmed from the predictable component—the part that can potentially be
forecast.
David Reifschneider and Tulip (2007) perform a wide-reaching analy-
sis of institutional forecasts—those of the Greenbook, the SPF, and the
Blue Chip, as well as forecasts produced by the Congressional Budget
Ofﬁce and the administration—for real GDP (or GNP) growth, the 
unemployment rate, and consumer price inﬂation. Although they do not
consider changes in forecast performance associated with the Great
Moderation, their analysis, which is undertaken for the post-1986 period,
ﬁnds overwhelmingly that errors for all institutional forecasts are large.
More broadly, Antonello D’Agostino, Domenico Giannone, and Paolo
Surico (2006) also consider a range of time-series forecasting models,
including univariate AR models, factor-augmented AR models, and
pooled bivariate forecasting models, as well as institutional forecasts—
those of the Greenbook and the SPF—and document that although RMSEs
for forecasts of real activity, inﬂation, and interest rates dropped notably
with the Great Moderation, time-series and institutional forecasts also
largely lost their ability to improve on a random walk. Jon Faust and
Jonathan Wright (2009) similarly note that the performance of some of the
forecasting methods they consider improves when data from periods pre-
ceding the Great Moderation are included in the sample.
We would argue that DSGE models should not be judged solely by their
absolute forecasting ability or lack thereof. Previous authors, such as 
Edge and others (2010), were conscious of the declining performance of
Greenbook and time-series forecasts when they performed their compari-
son exercises but took as given the fact that staff at the Federal Reserve
Board are required to produce Greenbook forecasts of the macroeconomy
eight times a year. More precisely, they asked whether a DSGE model
forecast should be introduced into the mix of inputs used to arrive at the
final Greenbook forecast. In this case relative forecast performance is a
relevant point of comparison. Another noteworthy aspect of central bank
ROCHELLE M. EDGE and REFET S. GÜRKAYNAK 229
12367-04a_Edge-rev3.qxd  2/17/11  10:08 AM  Page 229230 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
13. The divine coincidence (see Blanchard and Galí 2007 for the ﬁrst use of this term in
print) refers to a property of New Keynesian models in which stabilizing inﬂation is equiva-
lent to stabilizing the output gap, deﬁned as the gap between actual output and the natural
rate of output.
14. However, see Galí (2010) about the difﬁculties inherent in generating counterfactual
scenarios using DSGE models.
forecasting is that of “storytelling”: not only are the values of the forecast
variables important, but so, too, is the narrative explaining how present
imbalances will be unwound as the macroeconomy moves toward the bal-
anced growth path. A well-thought-out and much-scrutinized story accom-
panies the Greenbook forecast but is not something present in reduced-form
time-series forecasts. An internally consistent and coherent narrative is,
however, implicit in a DSGE model forecast, indicating that these models
can also contribute along this important dimension of forecasting.
In sum, what do these findings say about the quality of DSGE models
as a tool for telling internally consistent, reasonable stories for counter-
factual scenarios? Not much. That inflation will be unforecastable is a
prediction of basic sticky-price DSGE models when monetary policy
responds aggressively to inflation. Marvin Goodfriend and Robert King
(2009) make this point explicitly using a tractable model. If inflation 
is forecasted to be high, policymakers will increase interest rates and
attempt to rein in inflation. If they are successful, inflation will never be
predictably different from the (implicit) target, and all of the variation
will come from unforecastable shocks. In models lacking real rigidities,
the “divine coincidence” will be present,
13 which means that the output
gap will have the same property of unforecastability. Thus, it is quite pos-
sible that the model is “correct” and therefore cannot forecast cyclical
fluctuations but that the counterfactual scenarios produced by the model
can still inform policy discussions.
14
Of course, the particular DSGE model we employ in this paper does
not have the divine coincidence, because of the real rigidities it includes,
such as a rigidity of real wages due to having both sticky prices and sticky
wages. Moreover, because this model incorporates a trade-off between
stabilizing price inﬂation, wage inﬂation, and the output gap, optimal pol-
icy is not characterized by price inﬂation stabilization, and therefore price
inﬂation is not unforecastable. Nonetheless, price inﬂation stabilization is
a possible policy, which could be pursued even if not optimal, and this
would imply unforecastable inﬂation. That said, this policy would likely
not stabilize the output gap, thus implying some forecastability of the out-
put gap. Ultimately, whether and to what extent the model implies fore-
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be learned by simulating data from the model calibrated under different
monetary policy rules and performing forecast exercises on the simulated
data. We note the qualitative implication of the model that there should
not be much predictability, especially for inﬂation, and leave the quanti-
tative study to future research. Note also that our discussion here has
focused on the forecastability of the output gap, not of output growth,
which is ultimately the variable of interest in our forecast exercises.
Unforecastability of the output gap need not imply unforecastability of
output growth.
Finally, we would note that a reduced-form model with an assumed
inﬂation process that is equal to a constant with i.i.d. deviations—in other
words, a “wrong” model—will also have the same unforecastability impli-
cation. Thus, evaluating forecasting ability during a period such as the
Great Moderation, when no method is able to forecast, is not a test of the
empirical relevance of a model.
V. Robustness and Extensions
To verify that our results are not speciﬁc to the relatively short sample we
have used or to the Greenbook vintages we employed, we repeated the
exercise using Blue Chip forecasts as the judgmental forecast for the
1992–2010 period. (This test also has the advantage of adding the ﬁnancial
crisis and the Great Recession to our sample.) For this exercise we esti-
mated the DSGE model and the BVAR using data vintages of Blue Chip
publication dates and produced forecasts.
For the sake of brevity, we do not show the analogues of the earlier ﬁg-
ures and tables but simply note that the ﬁndings are very similar when Blue
Chip forecasts replace Greenbook forecasts and the sample is extended to
2010. (One difference is that the Blue Chip forecast has nowcasting ability
for GDP as well as inﬂation.) The DSGE model forecast is similar to the
judgmental forecast and is better than the BVAR, in terms of RMSEs, at
almost all horizons, but all three forecasts are again very poor. (This exer-
cise omits the forecasts of interest rates, since the Blue Chip forecasts do
not include forecasts of the overnight rate.) The longer sample allows us to
answer some interesting questions and provide further robustness checks.
Although we again use quarter-over-quarter changes and not annual
growth rates for all of our variables, overlapping periods in long-horizon
forecasting are a potential issue. In ﬁgure 5 we show the nonoverlapping,
4-quarter-ahead absolute errors of DSGE model forecasts made in January
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12367-04a_Edge-rev3.qxd  2/17/11  10:08 AM  Page 231of each year for the ﬁrst quarter of the subsequent year. The horizontal
lines at −0.25 and 0.25 indicate forecast errors that would be 1 percentage
point in annualized terms. Most errors are near or outside these bounds. It
is thus clear that our statistical results are not driven by outliers (a fact also
visible in ﬁgure 2).
To provide a better understanding of the evolution of forecast errors
over time, ﬁgure 6 shows 3-year rolling averages of RMSEs for 4-quarter-
ahead forecasts, using all 12 forecasts for each year. Not surprisingly,
these average forecast errors are considerably higher in the latter part of
the sample, which includes the crisis episode. The DSGE model does
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Figure 5. Nonoverlapping DSGE Four-Quarters-Ahead Forecast Errorsa
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 6. Three-Year Rolling Averages of Four-Quarters-Ahead RMSEs
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worse than the Blue Chip forecast once the rolling window includes 2008,
for both the inﬂation and the GDP growth forecasts.
Lastly, we compare the forecasting performance of the DSGE and
BVAR models with that of the Blue Chip forecasts during the recent 
crisis and recession. Figure 7 shows the forecast errors beginning with 
4-quarter-ahead forecasts and ending with the nowcast for three quarters:
2007Q4, the first quarter of the recession according to the National
Bureau of Economic Research dating; 2008Q3, when Lehman Brothers
failed and growth in GDP per capita turned negative; and 2009Q1, when
the extent of the contraction became clear (see Wieland and Wolters
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Sources: BEA data, Blue Chip Economic Indicators, and authors’ calculations.
12367-04a_Edge-rev3.qxd  2/17/11  10:08 AM  Page 2342010 for a similar analysis of more episodes). In all six panels in 
figure 7, the model forecast and the judgmental forecast are close to each
other when the forecast horizon is 4 quarters. Although all the forecasts
clearly first miss the recession, and then miss its severity, the Blue Chip
forecasts in general fare better as the quarter to be forecasted gets closer,
and especially when nowcasting.
An interesting point is that the judgmental forecast improves within
quarters, especially the nowcast quarter, whereas the DSGE and BVAR
model forecasts do not. As the quarter progresses, the DSGE model and
the BVAR model have access only to more revised versions of data 
pertaining to previous quarters. Forecasters surveyed by the Blue Chip sur-
vey, however, observe within-quarter information such as monthly fre-
quency data on key components of GDP and GDP prices as well as news
about policy developments. Also, the Blue Chip forecasters surely knew of
the zero nominal bound, whereas both of the estimated models (DSGE and
BVAR) imply deeply negative nominal rate forecasts during the crisis.
It is not very surprising that judgmental forecasts fare better in captur-
ing such regime switches. The DSGE model, lacking a ﬁnancial sector and
a zero nominal bound on interest rates, should naturally do somewhat bet-
ter in the precrisis period. In fact, that is the period this model was built to
explain. But this also cautions us that out-of-sample tests for DSGE
models are not truly out of sample as long as the sample is in the period the
model was built to explain. The next generation of DSGE models will
likely include a zero nominal bound and a financial sector as standard
features and will do better when explaining the Great Recession. Their real
test will be to explain—but not necessarily to forecast—the ﬁrst business
cycle that follows those models’ creation.
15
VI. Conclusion
DSGE models are very poor at forecasting, but so are all other approaches.
Forecasting ability is a nonissue in DSGE model evaluation, however,
because in recent samples (over which these models can be evaluated
using real-time data) there is little to be forecasted. This is consistent with
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15. A promising avenue of research is adding unemployment explicitly to the model, as
in Galí, Smets, and Wouters (2010). This will likely help improve the model forecasts, as
Stock and Watson (2010) show that utilizing an unemployment gap measure helps improve
forecasts of inﬂation in recession episodes.
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standard deviation of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations but also their nature has
changed. In particular, cycles today are driven more by temporary, unfore-
castable shocks.
The lack of forecasting ability is not, however, evidence against the
DSGE model. Forecasting ability is simply not a proper metric by which to
judge a model. Indeed, the DSGE model’s poor recent forecasting record
can be evidence in favor of it. Monetary policy was characterized by a
strongly stabilizing rule in this period, and the model implies that such pol-
icy will undo predictable ﬂuctuations, especially in inﬂation. We leave fur-
ther analysis of this point and of the forecasting ability of the model in pre-
and post–Great Moderation periods to future work.
APPENDIX
Constructing the Real-Time Datasets
In this appendix we discuss how we constructed the real-time datasets that
we use to generate all of the forecasts other than those of the Greenbook.
To ensure that when we carry out our forecast performance exercises we
are indeed comparing the forecasting ability of different methodologies
(and not some other difference), it is critical that the datasets and other
information that we use to generate our model forecasts are the same as
those that were available when the Greenbook and Blue Chip forecasts
were generated. For this we are very conscious of the timing of the releases
of the data that we use to generate our model forecasts and how they relate
to the Greenbook’s closing dates and Blue Chip publication dates.
We begin by documenting the data series used in the DSGE model and
in the other reduced-form forecasting models. Here relatively little discus-
sion is necessary, since we employ essentially all of the same data series
used by Smets and Wouters in estimating their model. We then move on to
provide a full account of how we constructed the real-time datasets used to
generate the model forecasts. We then brieﬂy explain our construction of
the “ﬁrst ﬁnal” data, which are ultimately what we consider to be the real-
ized values of real GDP growth and the rate of GDP price inﬂation against
which we compare the forecasts.
Data Series Used
To allow comparability with the results of Smets and Wouters (2007),
we use exactly the same data series that they used in their analysis.
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all of our data series (other than the federal funds rate), we need to be very
speciﬁc about not only which government statistical agency is the source
of the data series but also which data release we use.
Four series used in our estimation are taken from the national income
and product accounts (NIPA). These accounts are produced by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis and are constructed at quarterly frequency. The four
series are real GDP (GDPC), the GDP price deﬂator (GDPDEF), nominal
personal consumption expenditures (PCEC), and nominal ﬁxed private
investment (FPI). The variable names that we use, except that for real
GDP, are also the same as those used by Smets and Wouters. We use a dif-
ferent name for real GDP because whereas Smets and Wouters deﬁne real
GDP in terms of chained 1996 dollars, in our analysis the chained dollars
for which real GDP is deﬁned change with the data’s base year. (In fact,
the GDP price deﬂator also changes with the base year, since it is usually
set to 100 in the base year.)
Another series used in our estimation is compensation per hour in the
nonfarm business sector (PRS85006103), taken from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ quarterly Labor Productivity and Costs (LPC) release. The vari-
able name is that assigned to it by the data service (Macrospect) that Smets
and Wouters used to extract their data.
Three additional series used in our estimation are taken from the
Employment Situation Summary (ESS), which contains the ﬁndings of
two surveys: the Household Survey and the Establishment Survey. These
three series, which are produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and con-
structed at monthly frequency, are average weekly hours of production and
nonsupervisory employees for total private industries (PRS85006023),
civilian employment (CE16OV), and civilian noninstitutional population
(LNSINDEX). The ﬁrst of these series is from the Establishment Survey
and the other two are from the Household Survey. Since our model is quar-
terly, we calculate simple quarterly averages of the monthly data.
The ﬁnal series in our model, the federal funds rate, differs from the
others in that it is not revised after the ﬁrst release. This series is obtained
from the Federal Reserve Board’s H.15 release, published every business
day, and our quarterly series is simply the averages of these daily data.
We transform all of our data sources for use in the model in exactly the
same way as Smets and Wouters:
consumption = ln[(PCEC/GDPDEF)/LNSINDEX] × 100
investment = ln[(FPI/GDPDEF)/LNSINDEX] × 100
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hours = ln[(PRS85006023 × CE16OV/100)/LNSINDEX] × 100
inﬂation = ln(GDPDEF/GDPDEF−1) × 100
real wage = ln(PRS85006103/GDPDEF) × 100
interest rate = federal funds rate ÷ 4.
Obtaining the Real-Time Datasets Corresponding 
to Greenbook Forecasts
Appendix table A1 provides for the year 1997 what, in the vertical
dimension, is essentially a timeline of the dates of all Greenbook forecasts
and all release dates for the data sources that we use and that revise. The
horizontal dimension of the table sorts the release dates by data source.
The online appendix includes a set of tables for the whole 1992–2004 sam-
ple period. From these tables it is reasonably straightforward to understand
how we go about constructing the real-time datasets that we use to estimate
the models from which we obtain our model forecasts to be compared with
the Greenbook forecasts. Speciﬁcally, for each Greenbook forecast the
table shows the most recent release, or vintage, of each data source at the
time that edition of the Greenbook closed. For example, for the June 1997
Greenbook forecast, which closed on June 25, the tables show that the
most recent release of NIPA data was the preliminary release of 1997Q1,
on May 30, and the most recent release of the LPC data was the ﬁnal
release of 1997Q1, on June 18.
16
The ESS data require a little more explanation. These are monthly
series for which the ﬁrst estimate of the data is available quite promptly
(within a week) after the data’s reference period. Thus, for example, the
last release of the ESS before the June 1997 Greenbook is that for May
1997, released on June 6. Each ESS release, however, includes not only the
ﬁrst estimate of the preceding month’s data (in this case May) but also
revisions to the two preceding months (in this case April and March). This
means that from the perspective of thinking about quarterly data, the June 6
ESS release represents the second and ﬁnal revision of 1997Q1 data.
17
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16. Until last year the three releases in the NIPA were called the advance release, the
preliminary release, and the ﬁnal release. Thus, the preliminary release described above is
actually the second of the three. Last year, however, the names of the releases were changed
to the ﬁrst release, the second release, and the ﬁnal release. We refer to the original names of
the releases in this paper. Note also that there are only two releases of the LPC for each quar-
ter. These are called the preliminary release and the ﬁnal release.
17. Of course, the release also contains two-thirds of the data for 1997Q2, but we do not
use this information at all. This is reasonably standard practice.
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By looking up what vintage of the data was available at the time of each
Greenbook, we can construct a dataset corresponding to each Greenbook
that contains observations for each of our model variables taken from the
correct release vintage. All vintages for 1992 to 1996 (shown in tables 1 
to 5 in the online appendix) were obtained from ALFRED, an archive of
Federal Reserve economic data maintained by the St. Louis Federal
Reserve Bank. All vintages for 1997 to 2004 (shown in tables 6 to 13 in the
online appendix and, for 1997, in table A1 in this paper) were obtained
from datasets that since September 1996 have been archived by Federal
Reserve Board staff at the end of each Greenbook round.
In the June 1997 example given above, the last observation that we have
for each data series is the same: 1997Q1. This will not always be the case.
For example, in every January Greenbook round, LPC data are not avail-
able for the preceding year’s fourth quarter, ESS data are always available,
and NIPA data are sometimes available, speciﬁcally, only in the years
1992–94. This means that in the January Greenbook for all years other
than 1992–94, there is one more quarter of employment data than of NIPA
data. This is also the case in the October 2002 and 2003 Greenbooks; all
Greenbooks for which this is an issue are marked with a dagger (†) in
table A1 of this paper and in tables 1 to 13 of the online appendix.
Differences in data availability can also work the other way. For exam-
ple, in the Greenbooks marked with an asterisk (*) in table A1 of this paper
and tables 1 to 13 of the online appendix, there is always one less observa-
tion of the LPC data than of the NIPA data. We use the availability of the
NIPA data as what determines whether data are available for a given quar-
ter or not. Thus, if we have an extra quarter of ESS data (as we do in the
rounds indicated by †), we ignore those data, even those for HOURS, in
making our ﬁrst quarter-ahead forecasts. If instead we have one less quar-
ter of the LPC data (as we do in the rounds indicated by *), we use the
Federal Reserve Board staff’s estimate of compensation per hour for the
quarter, which is calculated based on the ESS’s reading of average hourly
earnings. This is always available in real time, since the ESS is very
prompt. Of course, this raises the question of why (given its timeliness) we
do not just use the ESS’s estimate for wages (that is, average hourly earn-
ings for total private industry) instead of the LPC’s compensation per hour
for the nonfarm business sector series. One reason is our desire to stay as
close as possible to Smets and Wouters, but another is that real-time data
on average hourly earnings in ALFRED extend back only to 1999. Also,
there are much more elegant ways to deal with the lack of uniformity 
in data availability that we face. In particular, the Kalman ﬁlter, which is
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are available for only some series. We leave this to future work.
Obtaining the Real-Time Datasets Corresponding 
to Blue Chip Forecasts
Tables 14 though 31 of the online appendix provide a timeline of the
dates for all Blue Chip forecasts and the release dates of all our data
sources. These tables are exactly analogous to tables 1 to 13 of the online
appendix for the Greenbook except that they extend further in time to
September 2009, one year before the conference draft of this paper was
written. Note also that there are 12 Blue Chip forecasts per year.
As with the Greenbook, there are instances where the last observation in
time differs across series. Indeed, this is more frequent for the Blue Chip,
because its survey of forecasters occurs at the beginning of the month,
close to the time when the ESS is released, whereas the preliminary release
of the LPC is usually at the beginning of February, May, August, and
November. The timing of the ESS’s release means that for every January,
April, July, and October edition of the Blue Chip forecasts, there is an
extra quarter of employment data that we do not use in the estimation.
Again, these rounds are marked with a dagger in tables 14 to 31 of the
online appendix. Blue Chip rounds marked with an asterisk denote those
for which we have one less quarter of LPC data than of NIPA data. In
these cases, however, the LPC data are released only a day or so later, so
we make the assumption that forecasters do have these data over the rele-
vant quarters. As with the Greenbook forecast, we use the availability of
NIPA data to determine whether data are available for a quarter.
Constructing the First Final Data
The data release tables also give some indication of how we construct
the “ﬁrst ﬁnal” data series, the series against which the Greenbook, Blue
Chip, and model forecasts are evaluated. Every third release of the NIPA
data and every second release of the LPC data is marked with an “F,”
indicating that it is the ﬁnal release of the data before they are revised in
either an annual or a comprehensive revision. For ESS releases, the ﬁnal
release for any quarter is indicated by “r2.” This denotes the second revi-
sion to the data, which is the last revision before any annual revision or
benchmarking is made. Note that even when considering our economic
growth forecasts, we are in fact considering real GDP growth per capita,
and for this reason we must also pay attention to the “ﬁrst ﬁnal” releases
of the ESS.
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observation—always the last one—from each ﬁnal (F) or second revision
(r2) vintage. We must, however, extract not the levels of these observa-
tions but rather the growth rates. The reason is that whenever there is a
comprehensive revision, the base year of real GDP and the GDP price
deﬂator changes, so that if we were to construct our ﬁrst ﬁnal series in lev-
els, the series would have large jumps at quarters where a comprehensive
revision takes place. Deriving our ﬁrst ﬁnal series in growth rates over-
comes this problem.
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Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
RICARDO REIS1 Progress in the study of short-run economic ﬂuctua-
tions seems to come in three stages. First, macroeconomists become excited
by the arrival of a new theoretical approach, a new set of principles to orga-
nize knowledge, or some new modeling tools. Second come the reﬁners,
who explore how to apply the idea to an increasing number of markets and to
tease out all of its implications. Third, a synthesis emerges, bringing together
the progress in different areas into one large model that tries to capture many
features of an aggregate economy. This last stage is always technically chal-
lenging and involves considerable ingenuity at ﬁne tuning models to match
the subtleties of the data.
One example of this evolution is the progress from Keynes’s ideas on the
role of aggregate demand, disequilibrium, and rigidities, to the reﬁning work
on the investment accelerator, the consumption function, money demand,
and the Phillips curve, ﬁnally leading to the synthesis of these ideas in the
large-scale MPS and Brookings models. Similarly, over the last 30 years,
the ideas of Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott (1982) and Gregory Mankiw
and David Romer (1991) were applied and refined, culminating in the
2000s in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) synthesis of
Lawrence Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans (2005) and
Frank Smets and Raf Wouters (2003). For a subgroup of macroeconomists,
work in the last few years has been solidly in the third, synthesis stage.
The DSGE approach has never lacked for criticism (for a recent critique,
see Caballero 2010), but until recently these models seemed successful at
empirically matching business cycle facts and producing short-run forecasts
that were as good as those from vector autoregressions (VARs). However,
1. I am grateful to Betsy Feldman, Dylan Kotliar, and Benjamin Mills for comments.
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only failed to predict the crisis but also were unable to provide an interpre-
tation of the events after the fact, because for the most part they omitted a
ﬁnancial sector. It is too early to tell whether this failure will lead to this
class of DSGE models being reﬁned or abandoned, but already it is clear
that their empirical performance must be judged more carefully.
This is what Rochelle Edge and Refet Gürkaynak set out to do in this
paper: to reassess empirically the forecasting performance of the Smets and
Wouters DSGE model. They explore how this model would have forecasted,
from 1 to 8 quarters ahead, movements in inﬂation, output growth, and inter-
est rates between 1997 and 2006. Importantly, they do not give the model
the unfair advantage of 20-20 hindsight. In 2000Q1, for example, their ﬁc-
tional econometrician produces estimates and forecasts using only the data
available at the time.
The conclusions of their exercise are surprising, at least to this reader. On
the positive side, the DSGE model’s forecasts beat those from a Bayesian
VAR as well as the Greenbook forecasts compiled by the staff of the
Federal Reserve, and its forecasts are precise, as demonstrated by their
small root mean squared errors (RMSEs). On the negative side, the fore-
casts themselves are terrible, worse than a simple naïve forecast of con-
stant inflation (or constant output growth), and worse than a forecast
that simply assumes that inflation equals its last available observation.
In addition, the model’s low RMSEs are much less impressive once one
realizes that the variance of inflation was also quite small during this
period. Rather, the forecasting power is close to zero, and trying to improve
the forecasts through some second-stage “cleaning” regressions makes
almost no difference.
Contemplating this outcome, the authors see the glass as half full. They
argue that according to the model, if monetary policy was effective, then
inﬂation should be difﬁcult to predict and should have a low variance. I am
considerably more skeptical of this point of view in light of the events of
the last 2 years. Inﬂation and output growth have not been stable since 2008,
but rather have fallen quite dramatically. At the same time, the model’s fore-
cast errors for 2008–10 are large and persistent, as figures 5 and 6 of the
paper demonstrate. If the authors’ explanation is correct, these two facts
would have been highly unlikely, unless monetary policy suddenly became
particularly ineffective during these last 2 years. I would argue instead that
larger shocks during this period simply exposed the model’s faults.
Beyond this general assessment, I will offer two comments on the paper,
as well as on the broader literature on DSGEs and forecasting. First, I will
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peculiar mix of Bayesian and frequentist elements. Second, I will argue
more generally that by setting themselves the goal of unconditional fore-
casting of aggregate variables, macroeconomists are setting such a high
bar that they are almost sure to fail. Instead I will argue, through reference
to a practical example, that DSGE models can be useful at making predic-
tions even when they fail at making forecasts.
FORECASTING METHODOLOGY. The problem of estimation and forecasting
with a DSGE model (or indeed with most models) can be expressed in the
following setup. Assume that a researcher has a model or structure, S, that
postulates some relationships among variables. The model has a vector
of parameters, , and some prior information is available about what their
values might be, captured in a probability density function p(⎟ S). The
sample of data that one is trying to explain at some date t, including current
and past observations of many variables, is denoted by yt, and its density is
p(yt⎟ S). Finally, the likelihood of having observed these data is the density
L(yt⎟ S,), which is typically known and easy to calculate given certain
assumptions about the normality of the distribution of shocks.
Edge and Gürkaynak use Bayes’s rule to estimate the parameters:
The output is a posterior density that reﬂects the uncertainty about the param-
eters through the whole posterior distribution. Although conceptually sim-
ple, this estimation work can be computationally exhausting. Fortunately,
there has been much progress on algorithms in this area, as evidenced by
the fact that Edge and Gürkaynak’s paper contains more than 300 estimates
of the model for different subsamples.
BAYESIAN ESTIMATION BUT NOT BAYESIAN FORECASTING. When it comes to
forecasting, the authors take a distinctly non-Bayesian approach. First, they
pick the mode of the posterior density at a date t: *
t = arg maxθ p( ⎟yt, S).
Next, they use the model’s law of motion to obtain the probability density
for the variable to be forecasted j periods ahead: p(yt+j⎟ yt, S, *). Finally,
they take the average over this density to represent their model forecast as
an expectation:
() , , , . 2 mS y p y y S y tj t tj tj t t tj ++ + + ∗ ( ) = ∗ ( ) ∫  d
() ,
,
. 1 py S
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mode of the density (akin to the maximum-likelihood estimator) and pro-
duce the unbiased point forecast. But this is unnatural to the Bayesian, who
is careful to take into account parameter uncertainty in the estimation stage,
and so does not want to ignore it by focusing on the mode when it comes to
forecasting. Likewise, it is awkward for a Bayesian to focus on one aver-
age forecast rather than report that there is a distribution of possible fore-
casts, each with some probability of occurring.
As I see it, asked what the model predicts for inﬂation or output j periods
out, the Bayesian forecaster would perform the following computation:
That is, she would consider both the uncertainty about the future due to the
possible arrival of shocks, captured as a density, p(yt+j ⎟yt, S, ), and the
uncertainty on the parameter estimates, captured as a posterior, p( ⎟yt, S).
Instead of producing a single average forecast, the Bayesian forecaster
would integrate over all the possible parameter combinations, , and report
not a single number but rather a density function of possible forecasts,
b(yt+j ⎟yt, S), given the current data and the model at hand. To assess whether
the model is good at forecasting, this econometrician might then ask, How
often does the actual realization of yt+j fall within the interquartile range of
its prediction, b(yt+j ⎟yt, S)? If this happens much less often than 75 percent
of the time, then the model is not giving good forecasts.
WHAT IS IN THE MODEL, WHAT IS IN THE PARAMETERS? Another difficulty
with the authors’ methodology is that although they try very hard to keep
future information from inﬂuencing their past forecasts, one can only push
this pseudo-forecasting exercise so far. The authors are careful to try to use
only data available up to date t to produce forecasts for date t + j. This care
is evident in two ways. First, the forecast, mt+j(*
t, S), depends on the pos-
terior estimate of parameters, *
t, which used only data up to date t. Sec-
ond, the data are not the revised data that we have today for that period, but
rather the data that forecasters had available at the time.
However, Edge and Gürkaynak use the model structure S at all dates, as
given to them by Smets and Wouters (2007). As the opening paragraph of
Smets and Wouters (2003) makes clear, this structure did not arise purely
from theory. Rather, it assumes a particular utility function with a very pecu-
liar habit term and a very specific law of motion. The Smets and Wouters
model assumes adjustment costs for some actions but not for others, and
() , , , , . 3 by yS py yS p yS tj t tj t t ++ ( ) = ( ) ( ) ∫   d
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looking index. All of these elements and more arose because the Smets and
Wouters model is the result of an iterative process between theorists and
the data over the previous 20 years. Thus, even if the authors’ estimates of
the parameters in 1992Q1 use only information available then, the struc-
ture brought to the data was arrived at by researchers looking continuously
at the data all the way into the 2000s and adjusting that structure to improve
its ﬁt and forecasting performance.
Moreover, the distinction between S and  is ultimately arbitrary. The
Smets and Wouters model has a Cobb-Douglas production function (the S)
for which the parameter is the labor share (the ). But one can also see this
as a production function with a constant elasticity of substitution (the S)
and with the labor share and this elasticity of substitution (the ) as param-
eters. Researchers used data covering all of the sample to agree on a strict
prior that the elasticity of substitution is exactly equal to 1, and this knowl-
edge has become embedded in the structure of the model, transitioning
from  to S. In short, Edge and Gürkaynak make forecasts from the per-
spective of the 1990s using the structure S that researchers arrived at from
interacting with the data in the 2000s.
THE HIGH, AND PERHAPS UNREALISTIC, EXPECTATIONS OF MACROECONOMISTS.
Turning more generally to the goal of the broad literature that uses DSGE
models in forecasting, I wonder whether macroeconomists are being unreal-
istically ambitious. At the same session of the Brookings Panel conference
at which Edge and Gürkaynak presented this paper, two other papers were
presented. In one, Thomas Dee and Brian Jacob build a regression model
of educational outcomes to identify the effects of the No Child Left Behind
policy. In the other, Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick offer a theory of the
role of shadow banks in the ﬁnancial system and use it to justify a form of
regulation. One could ask the authors of both papers, What are your uncon-
ditional forecasts for student achievement and total ﬁnancial assets, respec-
tively, in the United States for 2010–12?
If one attempted, literally, to use the models in those papers to make
such forecasts, the results would likely be terrible. But it is not hard to
guess that the authors would be puzzled that I would even be asking the
question, and almost surely they would not endorse the forecasts thus
arrived at. Nor, I would venture, would most, if not all, labor and finan-
cial economists. Most economists write models to capture some particu-
lar trade-offs and to make some limited predictions about what would
happen if a particular policy were followed. To many economists, it is
hard to imagine that one could know enough about any given market to
COMMENTS and DISCUSSION 249
12367-04b_Edge comments-rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:10 AM  Page 249make the type of unconditional forecasts sought in the question posed in
the previous paragraph.
Some macroeconomists, however, do not shy away from producing
unconditional forecasts. On the one hand, this is puzzling. If anything, our
ability to forecast many aggregate variables at once is likely smaller than
our ability to forecast outcomes in particular education or ﬁnancial mar-
kets. On the other hand, it is understandable that macroeconomists produce
these forecasts because there is an enormous demand for them from pol-
icymakers and the public at large. One consequence of this ambition to
produce unconditional forecasts is that, with some regularity, the forecasts
fail, sometimes in spectacular fashion. Forecasting is, simply put, a very
hard thing to do.
PREDICTION INSTEAD OF FORECASTING. Even if unconditional forecasting
may be too hard a task, a model can still make sharp predictions that are
useful to policymakers. As an interesting illustration, consider the chal-
lenge facing the Federal Reserve at the start of 2001Q3. The economy was
hit by a shock that economists did not predict (and, I would add, should not
have predicted): the September 11 terrorist attacks. Imagine that the Fed-
eral Reserve at the time was using the Smets and Wouters model estimated
by Edge and Gürkaynak to consider two possible policy responses to this
shock. One response would be to ignore the shock, keeping to the same
course of action as planned beforehand. This is displayed in my ﬁgure 1 as
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Figure 1. Federal Funds Rate: DSGE Model Forecast and Actual, 2001Q3–2003Q2
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other response would be to cut nominal interest rates aggressively. This is
captured in the ﬁgure by the actual path of interest rates that the Federal
Reserve followed. Figure 2 shows the effect of the two policies for inﬂa-
tion, and ﬁgure 3 for GDP. I obtained these by substituting the differences
between the two paths in figure 1 and treating those as innovations that
were then fed through the model. Because the solved Smets and Wouters
model is linear, this delivers the right partial effect from considering what
discretionary policy response to follow.
The model predicts that by aggressively cutting interest rates, the Federal
Reserve generated higher inﬂation throughout the next 2 years, cumulat-
ing to a difference of almost 0.3 percentage point. That implies that whereas
actual inﬂation in the United States was 0.3 percent in 2003Q2, if the Fed-
eral Reserve had not reacted to the shock, it would have been close to zero.
Similarly, according to the model, GDP growth, instead of being close to
zero between 2001Q3 and 2003Q2, would have been between −0.2 and
−0.3 percent for most of 2002 and 2003.
This is the type of prediction that, I would conjecture, policymakers want
from a model. It answers the following question: If some policy course is
COMMENTS and DISCUSSION 251
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a. Inflation is measured as the quarter-to-quarter change in the GDP deflator.
b. Inflation rate that would have prevailed had the Federal Reserve not changed its federal funds rate 
target after September 11, 2001.
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Figure 2. Inﬂation: DSGE Model Forecast, Actual, and Post–September 11
Counterfactual, 2001Q3–2003Q2
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answer two further questions. First, why is the model predicting this?
The impulse responses to monetary policy shocks in the model, and the
trade-offs that agents face within it, provide a clear answer to this question.
Second, how confident can we be about these predictions? This could be
easily assessed by using the Bayesian approach I described in the previous
section, rather than taking the modal estimate as I did for these plots.
This is where DSGE models excel. Indeed, few other types of models in
economics can compete with them at answering these types of questions.
DSGE models allow the researcher to provide precise quantitative predic-
tions, to quantify the uncertainty around them, and to attach to the forecasts
an internally coherent economic narrative. Considering more alternative
scenarios is easy within the model, and more broadly, the information pre-
sented this way can be supplemented with that from other models as well
as other subjective inputs.
If the models are going to be used this way, then one would like to know
how good these predictions are. Unconditional forecasts do not answer this
question, even if they give a strong hint (and the poor performance of
the forecasts found by the authors suggests that the predictions may not
be very trustworthy). As an alternative, researchers can (and do) compare
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Figure 3. GDP Growth: DSGE Model Forecast, Actual, and Post–September 11
Counterfactual, 2001Q3–2003Q2
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from natural experiments. Or they can use individual studies of the differ-
ent mechanisms that the model is synthesizing, to see if the different parts
of the story hold up on their own. I hope that more effort will go into reﬁn-
ing the tests of models along this dimension. This would help in judging
other DSGE models as well as in ultimately deciding whether the whole
DSGE research agenda is useful.
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COMMENT BY
CHRISTOPHER A. SIMS It is important from time to time to look at
the forecasting records of models used for policy analysis. This is how
forecasters and users of models learn which ones are more reliable and
discover ways to improve model specifications. Doing these evaluations
is harder than it might appear. Data revisions are of the same order of
magnitude as forecast errors, so it is essential to take a consistent view
of what is to be forecast and to make sure that forecasts being compared
are based on the same data. This is a formidable task if done carefully,
and this paper by Rochelle Edge and Refet Gürkaynak has indeed done
it carefully.
The paper says that the forecasts of dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium models, like the other forecasts it considers, have been “poor” and
“not very useful for policymaking” and that the DSGE model forecasts “do
COMMENTS and DISCUSSION 253
12367-04b_Edge comments-rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:10 AM  Page 253not contribute much information.” But there is in fact no support for these
conclusions in the data the paper displays.
The only way to justify a claim that a forecast is poor is to show that
some other feasible way to forecast was, or would have been, better. The
period covered by most of the authors’ tables and ﬁgures, running through
2006, was one of unusual macroeconomic stability. Previous studies of
forecast accuracy have shown that the margin of superiority of sophisti-
cated forecasting methods over naive methods was small in this period,
as is to be expected when the variables being forecast make small and
smooth movements. Yet the paper’s figure 3 shows that the DSGE
model forecasts had, for the most part, root mean square errors as good
as or better than every other feasible forecast the paper considers. In some
cases the “forecast” that the paper labels as a “constant” forecast does bet-
ter, but this is not a feasible alternative—it uses data from the future in
“forecasting” the future, so as to automatically eliminate bias in the fore-
cast. What is more remarkable is that the margin by which the DSGE
model forecasts improve on the other forecasts is not statistically small.
The paper points out (in a footnote!) that statistical tests show the DSGE
model forecasts to have better RMSEs than feasible purely statistical
alternatives (the Bayesian VAR and random walk forecasts) by a statis-
tically significant margin for inflation and GDP growth. One would like
to know what the corresponding results for forecasts of interest rates or
interest rate changes are. It might appear from ﬁgure 3 that the RMSEs are
essentially the same after the ﬁrst 2 quarters for interest rates, but because
the nowcast of interest rates by the Greenbook is so much more accurate
than the others, the scale in ﬁgure 3 is spread out, and the apparent simi-
larity of the RMSEs in that plot for later quarters may be misleading.
The paper also presents another approach to evaluating forecast accu-
racy, based on regressions of actual values on their forecasts. An ideal
forecast would have a coefﬁcient of 1 in such a regression and a constant
term of zero. In comparing forecasts meeting this ideal, the higher the R
2
for the regression, the better, and a higher R2 would imply a lower RMSE.
For inﬂation, the paper’s table 1 shows that all the forecasts have low R
2s
with actual values and statistically significant constant terms. They are
very far from “ideal.” Since the R
2s are low, the differences among the
forecasts in RMSE must be determined by their degree of bias and by the
scale of the random variation in the forecast around a constant. It is clear,
then, why the constant forecast does well, in terms of RMSEs, for inﬂa-
tion: in a contest where bias is a major determinant of accuracy, it has sim-
ply eliminated bias after seeing the future data. But for forecasts like these,
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and DSGE regression results look quite similar, even in the sizes of their
estimated coefﬁcients, yet the DSGE model’s RMSE is considerably bet-
ter, by a statistically signiﬁcant margin, than that of the BVAR at all hori-
zons beyond the ﬁrst.
The results for GDP growth in table 2 show a clear difference between
the DSGE model and the other two forecasts. Although one cannot be sure,
because the paper does not present the results of such tests, it looks as if the
DSGE model forecasts would pass a test of “rationality” (a slope of 1 and
an intercept of zero) at least at the 3-quarter horizon and beyond, whereas
the other two forecasts clearly would not. The picture that results is some-
what puzzling: the regression results suggest that there is little evidence
that using the longer-horizon DSGE model GDP forecasts in unmodiﬁed
form was a mistake, whereas there is strong evidence in the regression that
doing so with the Greenbook forecast of GDP was a mistake. This corre-
sponds to the clear margin of superiority in terms of RMSE for the DSGE
model over the Greenbook and the BVAR in ﬁgure 3 for GDP, but leaves
it a bit mysterious why the Greenbook forecasts emerge as statistically
indistinguishable in terms of RMSE from the DSGE forecasts. Possibly
this is a matter of using 95 percent conﬁdence levels to deﬁne “indistin-
guishable” when a difference would have emerged at the 90 percent
level, but one cannot be sure from the paper’s brief footnote discussion of
formal RMSE-difference tests.
The results for interest rates in tables 3 and 4 show a very different pic-
ture. The R
2s of the forecasts of interest rate levels (table 3) using actual
data are high, and it appears that tests of rationality might be passed at
longer horizons for all the models. (In saying such tests “might be passed,”
I am looking at whether the coefﬁcients lie within 2 standard errors of the
ideal-forecast values. This is not foolproof, because the estimated coefﬁ-
cients could be correlated.) Table 4 shows that this good performance is
not simply a consequence of making “no change” forecasts for interest rate
levels. The R
2s are statistically signiﬁcantly positive at the 10 percent level
for forecasts of interest rate changes at most long horizons for both the
BVAR and the DSGE forecasts, and again it appears that at these horizons,
in most cases, these forecasts would pass tests of rationality. It is not
surprising that the Greenbook does not do so well at long-horizon fore-
casting of changes in interest rates, because for most of this period the
Greenbook forecasts assumed constant interest rates.
The message from tables 3 and 4 is that although the DSGE interest
rate forecasts were not clearly better than those of a BVAR, there was a
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BVAR and the DSGE forecasts succeeded in capturing it.
Where does this pattern of results leave us? Certainly not with a conclu-
sion that the DSGE forecasts were “poor.” This is especially true when one
considers that the DSGE model is known, through published research on
its impulse responses, to imply strong reactions of the economy to interest
rate changes generated by policy. If the DSGE model had misestimated
these reactions, therefore, it would have produced, in a period with sub-
stantial, predictable variation in interest rates, mistaken forecasts of GDP
and inﬂation. Rather, the DSGE model produced forecasts of stable inﬂa-
tion and GDP growth by correctly modeling the response of monetary
policy to the state of the economy, thereby producing good interest rate
forecasts, and then by correctly modeling the stabilizing effects of these
interest rate policy reactions on GDP growth and inﬂation.
A few less central aspects of the paper also deserve comment. First, the
paper observes that a 2-standard-error conﬁdence band for inﬂation 6 quar-
ters ahead would be, according to the authors’ calculations, 4 percentage
points wide and says that such a conﬁdence interval is “not very useful for
policymaking.” But this is the actual level of the uncertainty. The paper
gives no evidence that some other way of forecasting could reduce this
uncertainty. It should certainly be “useful” to policymakers to know the
actual level of uncertainty. And this level of uncertainty would not in fact
look unreasonable to most policymakers. Central banks that produce regu-
lar inﬂation reports usually display forecasts of inﬂation and output as fan
charts, with clear error bands that widen over time. Policymaking in these
countries is based on these projections and error bands, and the fan charts
show forecast uncertainty consistent with the degree of forecast accuracy
shown in ﬁgure 3 for the DSGE model forecasts. For example, the Swedish
Riksbank’s October 2010 Monetary Policy Report shows a fan chart for
inﬂation in which the 90 percent band for annualized consumer price inﬂa-
tion 6 quarters ahead is about 4.8 percentage points wide, and of course a
95 percent band would be considerably wider. The error bands are said to
be based on the historical record of Riksbank forecast accuracy, and the
fan charts seem informative about expected future inﬂation, as well as real-
istic about the uncertainty surrounding these expectations.
The paper describes its priors, both for the DSGE model itself and for
the BVAR naive standard of comparison, only by reference to Smets and
Wouters (2003). It is unfortunate that the seminal Smets and Wouters
paper used a prior for the BVAR that is highly simpliﬁed relative to any
that would be used in a serious forecasting application of BVARs. The
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has a number of parameters that in any particular application have to be
tuned, either by a formal Bayesian procedure that would integrate over a
prior on these parameters, or informally by experimenting with a few set-
tings of them, to be sure that the default settings are not far out of sync with
the data. Smets and Wouters set these parameters at default values without
checking whether the default values were reasonable for their data. The
claim in the original Smets and Wouters papers that their DSGE model
speciﬁcation ﬁts better than their BVAR comparison model is itself fragile
if the parameters of the prior are handled more realistically. The BVAR
might have been a stronger competitor to the DSGE model in this paper’s
analysis if the BVAR prior had been handled more carefully.
Finally, one of the main advantages of DSGE models estimated by
Bayesian methods over previous vintages of econometric policy models is
that the DSGE models provide usable measures of postsample uncertainty
about parameters, and hence of uncertainty about forecasts. We are there-
fore interested at least as much—maybe more—in whether the model’s
characterization of the distribution of forecast errors is correct as we are in
the accuracy of the point forecasts. This paper could have cited measures
of this distributional accuracy, reporting, for example, how often actual
values lay outside the model’s implied 68 percent or 90 percent error bands
as computed at the forecast date. That the paper did not seems to me a lost
opportunity.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION Justin Wolfers noted that the Bayesian setup
means that the authors have a probability distribution over likely forecast
errors, and hence he suggested that the authors use the full set of model pos-
teriors to compare the size of the average forecast errors with those implied
by the model.
Annette Vissing-Jorgensen remarked that the stock market should be
useful in forecasting, since it is a valuable predictor of consumption growth.
She was not sure how valuable an addition it would be in forecasting
inflation, but it could be a useful indicator for GDP.
David Romer noted the paper’s emphasis on the fact that, in baseline
New Keynesian models like the DSGE model they use, inflation is not
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important predictable component—which it appears to, based on its lagged
values—inflation has an important forecastable component as well. He
also commented that the paper’s characterization of the model as predict-
ing little variation in inﬂation during the sample period was somewhat of
an exaggeration, and that the paper’s ﬁgure 2 showed nontrivial variation
in predicted inﬂation.
Donald Kohn expressed the hope that the recent period would turn
out to be an outlier not worth including in the analysis. He noted that the
DSGE model is not useful when policymakers need it most. Nor does it
have a ﬁnancial sector, which is a problematic omission given that sector’s
central role in the crisis. The Federal Reserve’s FRB-US model has a rich
financial sector, which could be adapted in an ad hoc way. As it is, how-
ever, the model is not useful for policy when interest rates are at their zero
lower bound. Whatever the virtues and limitations of the various models,
policymakers still have to know when to abandon the model and recognize
the story that is unfolding around them.
Robert Gordon objected to the so-called New Keynesian Phillips curve
embedded in all DSGE models, including that in the paper. By omitting
the impact on inﬂation of supply shocks, including changes in the relative
price of energy and of imports, as well as the impact of changes in trend
productivity growth and of the imposition and then termination of the
Nixon price controls in 1971–74, the models’ inflation equations omit
signiﬁcant variables that give rise to a negative correlation between inﬂa-
tion and output. As a result, all New Keynesian Phillips curves report
coefﬁcients of inﬂation on the output gap that are biased toward zero.
Christopher Sims noted that models do sometimes forecast interest
rates, and thus it is not hard to condition on interest rates not going below
zero. Observing that GDP had been somewhat better forecasted by the
DSGE model than inflation, Sims thought the zero lower bound should
be imposed on the model either by building it in or by throwing out simu-
lations with forecasted paths implying negative rates.
William Nordhaus thought that, in some sense, oranges were being
compared to tangerines. There is a difference between a true forecast
and a forecast that allows itself a peek at the future. The Blue Chip and
Greenbook forecasts are true forecasts, but the DSGE forecasts are not.
True forecasts will probably come from DSGE models in the future, but as
of yet this has not happened. All forecasts are indeed quite poor, as the
paper recognizes, and we often do not remember how poor they were after
the fact. Nordhaus wondered what would be revealed by surveying a wider
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cially about the extent to which forecasters’ predictions tend to cluster
together.
Ricardo Reis noted that recent research on the Smets-Wouters model
interprets some of its residuals as being accounted for by the missing
ﬁnancial sector. However, he thought that where the model was most deﬁ-
cient was in its treatment of ﬁscal policy, and speciﬁcally its assumptions
that government purchases are exogenous and that taxes are lump sum
and neutral.
Robert Hall closed the discussion by reminding the Panel that Paul
Samuelson had once said, at a Brookings Papers conference years ago, “If
you have to forecast, forecast often.”
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